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The paper focuses on the non-linearity of the transmission of the impact of globalization 
on poverty and the existence of threshold effects. Institutions constitute a critical factor 
for the creation of threshold effects in the impact of globalization on poverty. 
Institutions—their credibility, ability to be transformed by globalization, and the ways 
they give the poor access to the beneficial effects of globalization—determine whether 
the benefits of globalization are spread to the poor or are locked in by particular groups. 
They also determine whether or not the negative shocks associated with globalization 
are transmitted in an unfettered manner. The paper presents a theory of institutions that 
distinguishes several components, which evolve differently and explain the threshold 
effects that institutions generate upon the impact of globalization on the poor. The paper 
then shows that social institutions and norms have a critical role in the generation of 
these threshold effects. It finally examines the interactions between social institutions 
and state policies institutions, which may contribute to the formation of poverty traps. 
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Introduction 
Globalization and poverty represent broad, multidimensional concepts which refer to 
phenomena that transform themselves in space and time. The literature on the impacts 
of globalization on poverty points to highly variable outcomes, both positive and 
negative, as well as multiple causalities, channels and mechanisms that link 
globalization and poverty. Studies observe different results depending on the channels, 
historical period, and the region or country considered. As is known, the inconclusive or 
variable character of these findings is a matter of intense debate, as are the concepts of 
globalization and poverty themselves. 
This paper argues that this variability of outcomes stems from a key feature of the 
impact of globalization on poverty, which is the non-linearity of transmission of 
globalization’s impact and the existence of threshold effects. It also argues that 
institutions constitute a critical factor in creating these threshold effects in the 
transmission of the impact of globalization on poverty. Analyses that focus on 
globalization and global poverty increasingly stress the importance of institutions. No 
existing work, however, has examined institutions in relation to the threshold effects 
that characterize the links between globalization and poverty. 
The paper also shows that institutions create discontinuities and generate threshold 
effects upon the impact of globalization on the poor. Institutional environments and the 
presence or absence of critical institutions indeed determine whether the benefits of 
globalization are harnessed and spread to the poor, whether these benefits are locked in 
by particular groups with the poor being excluded from them, or the negative shocks 
associated with globalization are transmitted to the poor in an unfettered manner. 
Institutions introduce these threshold effects because of their composite nature: 
institutions are indeed made of distinct components—forms and contents (functions, 
mental models, for example)—which evolve differently. In particular, institutions may 
generate processes of cumulative causation and self-sustained poverty traps. The impact 
of globalization on poverty in a given setting is positive or negative depending on the 
multiple characteristics of the various components of institutions: among others, their 
historical depth, credibility, the way they combine, their ability to be transformed by 
globalization, and the ways they give the poor access to the effects of globalization that 
are beneficial to them. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the definitional issues associated 
with the concepts of globalization, poverty and institutions, as well as the different 
causalities and the heterogeneity of the processes that link globalization, poverty and 
institutions. Section 2 presents a theory of institutions as composite arrangements: this 
composite character explains the existence of the threshold effects that institutions 
generate upon the impact of globalization on the poor. Section 3 highlights the influence 
of the domestic political economy on institutions and its contribution to the threshold 
effects that modify the impact of globalization. Section 4 shows the critical role of 
social institutions and norms in the generation of these discontinuities and threshold 
effects. Section 5 examines the interaction between social institutions, public 
institutions and policies and macroeconomic conditions, which may contribute to the 
formation of poverty traps. The final section offers brief concluding remarks.   2
1  Globalization, poverty, and institutions: definitions and causalities 
1.1  Globalization and poverty 
The concepts of globalization and poverty remain the objects of intense debate, in 
particular with regard to the definitions and indicators of globalization: integration in 
the commodity, labour, and capital markets,1 ‘freedom and ability of individuals and 
firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries’, and 
‘greater mobility of capital and labour’.2 Globalization encompasses heterogeneous 
elements: facts (flows, such as trade, capital, labour, migration, information, and market 
integration) and policies (reduction of barriers on trade, financial flows and migration, 
liberalization). Depending on the aspect of globalization considered, the function of 
institutions differs. They may provide credibility to government’s commitments and 
policies, enforce property rights for foreign investment, and reduce information costs 
and allow the pooling of risks for small-scale farmers. 
The concept of poverty has re-emerged in academic research as well as the agenda of 
international financial institutions in the 1990s (Kanbur and Lustig 2000), and, as noted 
by Deaton (2004), economic development has been increasingly conceived as poverty 
reduction rather than economic growth. Poverty, as is well-known, has many 
dimensions (subjective and objective, relative and absolute, and monetary and non-
monetary). Measurement remains a key issue and, as highlighted by Ravallion (2003, 
Chen and Ravallion 2004), divergence in the assessment of the impact of globalization 
on poverty mostly stems from differences in the definitions, data, and measurement 
assumptions. Institutions intervene in all these aspects—their definitions, and the 
methods of assessing their effects—to contribute to divergence in the analyses of this 
impact. 
The channels of transmission from globalization to poverty reduction are numerous and 
include economic as well as political economy channels (government policy, domestic 
allocation, technology transmission) that affect wages, employment, household 
production, and consumption (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004). As shown by a number of 
studies, one has to differentiate the impact of globalization on growth and the impact of 
growth on poverty—globalization impacting on poverty directly through changes in 
relative prices and indirectly through growth effects.3 There is a consensus, despite a 
few dissenting studies,4 that globalization is positive for growth and hence for reducing 
poverty. 
Globalization has improved the situation of the poor in certain countries and regions but 
not in others. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most affected by poverty where the 
impact of trade openness since the reforms of the 1980s has been mixed. Many 
                                                 
1   Definition provided in Bordo, Taylor and Williamson (2003). 
2   As defined by the World Bank, quoted in Milanovic (2003a). 
3   Nissanke and Thorbecke (2004); another well-known issue is the elasticity of poverty reduction to 
growth and initial inequality, see Bourguignon (2004a). 
4   Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999); see in a historical context Clemens and Williamson (2001).   3
explanations for this have been provided, such as economic and geographical 
constraints (climate), policy (resistance to reform) and institutional factors. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a clear example where, in addition to economic 
determinants, the presence or absence of certain institutions constitutes additional 
factors that promote or hinder the transmission of global forces to the poor, as well as 
induce discontinuities and unexpected consequences. 
1.2  The difficulty in defining institutions 
Institutions mediate the various channels and mechanisms of the effects of globalization 
and explain the latter’s diversity, heterogeneity, and non-linearity. Definitions of 
institutions remain, however, a debated issue. Institutions are coextensive to societies 
and economies, as there cannot be a society without institutions;5 institutions are 
simultaneously a particular dimension in the regulation of human activity. Institutions in 
essence depend on contexts, whether in the definitions based on transaction costs set up 
by the new institutional economics, in the game equilibrium perspectives (evolutionary 
or repeated games),6 or in the evolutionary theory that focuses on learning processes 
and competition (Nelson and Winter 2002). Douglass North’s (1990, 1991) definitions 
are the best known: institutions are constraints that structure political, economic, and 
social interactions and consist of informal—i.e., self-enforcing—constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct, conventions, norms of behaviour) and 
formal regulations (constitutions, laws, property rights). 
Definitions and functions of institutions are sometimes confused in the literature. The 
boundaries of institutions are also often fuzzy. Institutions may be defined as sets of 
property rights as well as devices aimed at the protection of these property rights. They 
are also defined as devices reducing transaction costs, instruments allowing stable 
anticipations, strengthening incentives, channelling resources, flexible responses to 
uncertainty, and so on. Characteristics of institutions, such as trust or credibility, are 
also often confused with the institutions themselves. Institutions may also be equated to 
a type of infrastructure (other than physical infrastructure). Similarly, the distinction 
between institutions and policies is sometimes unclear. Policies are the outcomes of 
state institutions, such as trade or taxation policies (institutions and policies or policy 
outcomes may even be synonymous in some studies), but policies also determine 
institutions—they create or reform institutions.7 
Institutions are also alternatively viewed as both causes and effects. As argued by North 
and Thomas (1973, quoted by Hoff 1995), ‘innovation, economies of scale, education, 
capital accumulation … are not causes of growth; they are growth’. Likewise, property 
rights may be viewed simultaneously as institutions and the outcomes of institutions, as 
state institutions protect property rights. The literature, however, recognizes that many 
                                                 
5   As highlighted by Kaushik Basu in his comments of this paper (2004). 
6   A conceptual framework is in Aoki (2001). 
7   Levels of taxation or infrastructure are assimilated to institutions in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2005 on the investment climate.   4
institutions have no link with property rights (for example, the easing of exchanges and 
transactions). 
1.3  The various categories, domains, and levels of institutions 
Institutions may be categorized according to a series of dichotomies: state and non-state; 
market and non market; formal and informal, though these dichotomies are weakened 
by many problems of definition, logical consistency and conceptual overlap (Sindzingre 
2004). Institutions are also domestic or external to countries (supra-state), which is a 
dimension of globalization (the so-called ‘global governance’). In poor and weak states 
this is compounded by their dependence on aid and policy conditionality. 
Institutions also regulate different domains of human activity: economic (when 
generating market-oriented incentives or protecting property rights), political (when 
managing conflict or enhancing political stability),8 and social. Institutions regulating 
social relationships consist of sets of social norms that operate at the household, 
territorial, and group levels. These have been analyzed by transaction costs theories and 
theories based on asymmetries of information. The latter have explained several 
agrarian institutions in poor countries, such as interlinked markets (credit, insurance, 
land, for example) (Bardhan 1989). 
At a microeconomic level, institutions and norms introduce thresholds in the causal link 
between globalization and poverty, for example, the institutions that favour or prevent 
collective action, regulate personal exchanges, social relationships and inequalities for 
individuals, households and groups—in particular redistributive institutions and 
insurance mechanisms, which may either redistribute or concentrate the gains of 
liberalization. 
At a macro level the state partitions globalization flows (trade, capital, labour) between 
external and internal flows that fall under state prerogatives and rules. Thresholds in the 
impact of globalization stem in the first place from artefacts such as borders, which 
show resilience in a context of globalization.9 As is well-known, dynamics of global 
inequality differ according to whether or not inequality occurs within or between 
countries. The state provides credibility—because it represents the highest level of 
capacity to commit—to other levels of public institutions (legal, parliamentary, 
economic) and to government policies. The state has a key role in channelling the 
impact of global integration. Early development economists viewed the role of the state, 
of domestic policies and of institutions as analytically pre-eminent in developing 
countries, as the state is able to reallocate better than the markets the factors of 
production towards growth. This has been the framework of the ‘big push’ policies or of 
the ‘developmental’ states’ industrial policies in East Asia. The state, however, has also 
intensified the negative impact of globalization on poverty, as shown by cases of ‘weak’ 
and predatory states, such as in SSA. 
                                                 
8   On the links between institutions and growth, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002). 
9   States have rather tended to multiply in the twentieth century, see Alesina and Spolaore (1997).   5
State institutions may or may not be able to provide rapid and flexible policy responses 
to external shocks, help the poor to cope with these shocks (such as volatility in the 
price of inputs), address market failures that primarily affect the poor (such as 
information asymmetries), or support particular market structures that are more 
effective in terms of risk management such as economic diversification. Likewise state 
institutions may or may not help to develop savings and investment as well as the 
entrepreneurial capacities of the poor, promote the marketization of goods that are 
produced by the poor, or reduce vulnerabilities that stem from the dualism and 
imbalances of employment structures, such as the pre-eminence of the primary sector 
(agriculture or natural resource extraction) compared to off-farm employment. 
1.4  Institutions, poverty and globalization:  
multiple-way causalities and heterogeneous processes 
The relationship between institutions and economic growth and development is the 
object of a vast literature. The effects of institutions on poverty, however, have been 
less investigated. This is also true of the relationship of institutions with globalization 
and how this has influenced its impact on poverty—or, conversely, the transformation 
of institutions as well as the transformation of their effects on poverty.10 It is argued 
here that the effects of institutions are not linear; they follow processes of cumulative 
causation, create threshold effects, discontinuities and self-sustained poverty traps.11 
Causalities and threshold effects work through several retroactive channels, from 
globalization to poverty, and from poverty to ways of coping with globalization (for 
example, trade policies). This in turn induces specific impacts of globalization. The 
impact of globalization on poverty through institutions may be positive or negative. 
Two causal processes may be distinguished. The first is the impact of globalization on 
institutions. Globalization is a factor in institutional change, which in turn may have 
positive or negative effects on poverty reduction. This causal process is, however, 
confronted with the asymmetry between the causal event (change in prices, mobility of 
factors) and its objects (institutions, norms). It is also confronted with the heterogeneity 
of the speed of transformation of the causal event (globalization) and its objects 
(institutions). The latter exhibits far more persistence than the former, which is why 
explaining growth rates by institutions remains puzzling (Easterly et al. 1993).12 
Institutions create stable expectations; the pace of institutional evolution thus tends to be 
slow, with more or less rapid transformation depending on the category and domain of 
the institution. 
According to Fernand Braudel’s (1996) seminal distinction, three types of institutions 
correspond to three speeds of change: (i) social institutions and norms (incurring the 
                                                 
10  With exceptions, of course, on the necessity of appropriate institutions for harnessing the benefits of 
globalization; see Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004). 
11  Non-linearities of the effects of globalization on the poor have been highlighted in many studies—
while cumulative causation has been featured in theories of economic development since the 1950s—
but without the focus on institutions, see Agenor (2002b). 
12 This indeed fuels the heated debate on institutions, geography, policies or structures (commodity 
dependence, terms of trade volatility) as fundamental determinants of growth.   6
slowest transformation),13 (ii) economic structures, (iii) and political institutions (that 
are transformed the fastest) (Arrow 1998, Braudel 1996). Globalization as a set of flows 
and policies is more likely to induce transformation on the aspects of institutions that 
are already experiencing rapid change (for example, formal political or economic rules), 
and less likely on slow-changing institutions such as social norms. 
The second causal process is the impact of institutions on globalization. Globalization is 
‘filtered’ (intensified or hindered) by institutions at the country and micro levels 
(village, households). The mediation by institutions introduces unexpected 
consequences and non-linearities in the transmission mechanisms that orient them 
towards either beneficial or detrimental outcomes for the poor. 
In summary, causalities follow three dichotomies: the positive effects of globalization 
versus its negative effects, respectively, (i) on the domestic institutions that are causes 
of poverty (exclusionary ones, like caste, for example); (ii) on institutions reducing 
poverty (household structure allowing accumulation, for example); (iii) on the 
institutions that enhance the positive aspects of globalization (such as economic 
freedom) or intensify its negative aspects (such as weak support for economic 
diversification). 
1.5 Assessing  causalities:  issues  of measurement and endogeneity 
An increasing number of studies have put forward institutions as the key determinants 
of growth (Rodrik et al. 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2004; for an opposing view, see Glaeser 
et  al. 2004).), which has given rise to heated controversies as to their exogenous 
character. Studies often rely on growth cross-country regressions, where institutions are 
used as determinants of growth in addition to more traditional variables (such as 
investment). Institutions are also used as explanatory variables in regressions explaining 
poverty or globalization. The variables that approximate institutions, however, are 
generally broad notions, such as trust, rule of law, protection of contracts and property 
rights, civil liberties, political stability, and social cohesion and homogeneity. There is 
now a consensus on the fact that ‘institutions matter’, but no consensus exists as to 
which institutions matter or on what the direction of the causalities is (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 2003b). Instruments are sometimes confused with explanations (Rodrik 2004), 
and models are often affected by implausibility and econometric flaws (Durlauf and 
Quah 1999). 
Causalities are subjected to the endogeneity of the institutional variables vis-à-vis those 
they are supposed to explain (growth, level of income) (Basu et al. 1987), for example, 
between institutions, trade openness and poverty. Economic policies are particular 
outcomes of institutions, but policies, such as trade barriers, have been used as a proxy 
for weak institutions. Simultaneously, openness policies transform domestic institutions 
and their influence on poverty, and trade creates institutional forms.14 Endogeneity also 
                                                 
13  Speeds of change also vary within categories of institutions: monetary institutions may be changed 
more rapidly than labour institutions; in social institutions, codes of conduct may be changed more 
easily than kinship institutions. 
14    See Greif (1989) on the contrast between the Maghribi and Genoese traders, creating different 
institutions and trust-building devices in the course of their trade activities.   7
affects the many studies that try to isolate the determinants of growth among the three 
categories of policies, geography and other endowment variables, and institutions.15 
Policies and institutions may be endogenous vis-à-vis each other, and even geography is 
not necessarily an exogenous variable (as shown by migration). Political institutions are 
also endogenous vis-à-vis growth,16 as well as social and micro-political mechanisms 
such as trust and accountability. 
1.6  The problems of observing thresholds and aggregation 
The emergence of ‘trust’ or ‘cohesion’ and their causal relationship with particular 
forms of institutions and their effectiveness represent complex processes that depend on 
context and are best observed through case studies. Econometric exercises work at an 
aggregate level and observe aggregate threshold effects. They are ill-equipped, 
however, to apprehend the multiple micro-mechanisms and norms, as well as the 
underlying threshold effects that stem from the influence of institutions. Indeed these 
norms work at the individual or group level and contribute to the effectiveness of an 
institution (and its credibility), hinder or intensify the gains or losses from globalization, 
build local poverty traps or trigger opportunities for escaping them. 
Institutional variables may be discrete, stable in space and time, and lend themselves to 
quantification and aggregation. Many institutional variables, however, do not exhibit 
such properties of stability in time and space (the former on account of historical 
transformation and the latter because of adaptive, borrowing processes). Isolating 
threshold effects in the impact of globalization, however, requires aggregate data, which 
are typically not used in qualitative analyses. The latter in turn only observe particular 
before–after processes, which are sui generis cases and cannot be aggregated, 
particularly in the case of micro institutions and institutional change. A methodological 
difficulty remains in this tension on the one hand between models that assess non-
linearities but with questionable concepts of institutions and, on the other, case studies 
that may have appropriate concepts but do not use aggregate data. 
2  Threshold effects due to the very nature of institutions:  
institutions as composite arrangements 
2.1  The different components of institutions: forms and contents 
Institutions are composite sets of rules that shape various levels of human cognition and 
activity. They are simultaneously constituted by forms—i.e., names, organizations—and 
contents—i.e., functions, meanings—which display distinct evolutions and speeds of 
change. Institutions that bear similar names do not possess identical credibility, 
capacities of regulation and generation of incentives from one environment to another. 
The actual form and content of institutions are determined by several factors—history, 
cumulative processes, level of economic development, and state capacity, among others. 
                                                 
15  For defenders of geography, see Bloom and Sachs (1998), Easterly and Levine (2002). 
16  Bardhan (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993). Aghion et al. (2002).   8
Their rules organize the behaviour of different agents (individuals, households, firms, 
governments), settings—market (agricultural production, labour markets, access to 
capital, human or financial, for example) and non-market activities (state institutions, 
for example)—and economic sectors (rural, industrial and financial, for example). 
Therefore, the impact of globalization on the poor cannot intrinsically be a linear 
process. Institutions do not constitute discrete entities that enter into unambiguous 
relationships with other similar variables. The channels and mechanisms of the impact 
of globalization are altered by local institutions that are in fact constituted by distinct 
components. Under apparently similar forms, the effective contents of given institutions 
may differ: these apparently similar institutions therefore channel the impact of 
globalization on the poor in different ways—for example, depending on contexts, 
positive, negative, first positive then negative, or both positive and negative according 
to the domains considered (economic, financial, social, or political). 
2.2  Efficiency of institutions as an outcome of relationships between components 
The ‘formal’ existence of institutions provides individuals with little information as to 
their effectiveness, and few stable expectations on the way individual behaviour is ruled 
by these institutions, and hence on their effective functions ex post. The ‘formal’ 
existence of institutions provides little information on the effective enforcement of 
rights or rules (property rights, rule of law), or on the ‘capture’ of institutions and legal 
systems by interest groups. Functions of institutions do not map into unique forms, as 
argued by Rodrik in the case of weak property rights in China: their various functions 
(such as providing stability for investment) are achieved by other institutions, in 
contrast with Russia, where institutions formally exist but do not fulfil their functions 
(Rodrik 2004). The formal existence of institutions does not imply the similarity of their 
local content across time and across countries or settings (for example, the content 
attached to ‘accountability’, investment regulation, or safety nets). The mechanisms 
leading from globalization to poverty via institutions are therefore under-determined 
ex ante. Threshold effects, positive or negative, stem from the effective content and 
functions of institutions that underlie their formal existence, and may be more 
accurately analysed case-by-case. 
Indeed the efficiency of institutions stems not only from their constitutive elements 
(forms and contents) but also from the relationships between these components, and 
from their relationships with other institutions (Sindzingre 2003). Institutions, as 
composite sets of rules, are more or less pervasive and effective; their effects are 
observable ex post for they result from a combination of institutions in addition to 
exogenous variables (such as endowments, land abundance, climate). For example, 
redistributive institutions, such as those supporting land reform, have different effects 
on poverty depending on whether they combine with land abundance or scarcity. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of institutions aimed at helping the poor to cope with trade 
liberalization is not only made up of various constituents (policy measures, 
organisational rules) but by the relationship between them. Effectiveness depends, for 
example, on human capital, political economy, social ‘trust’ or ‘cohesion’, as well as on 
the relationship with other institutions (such as those supporting technology, 
information, rule of law). For example, the effectiveness of business regulation is 
contingent on the presence of effective judicial institutions. The impact of policy   9
measures, such as trade, industrial, or diversification incentives focused on the poor, is 
contingent on institutional combinations, particularly state capacity. 
Forms do not correspond to unique contents, and growth results from contingent 
combinations of policies, structures and institutions. For example, institutions dealing 
with safety nets have often been inefficient in SSA, while limited state-provided safety 
nets did not prevent Asian countries from exhibiting a positive link between 
globalization and poverty. Authoritarianism has been combined with poverty reduction 
in South Korea (a ‘developmental state’) but not in the predatory political regimes often 
found in SSA. In Taiwan authoritarianism has also been combined with an output based 
on small and medium enterprises (absent in SSA), based on specific models of growth, 
poverty reduction and a combination of economic structure, initial conditions, 
geography, political regime, policy, and external integration. 
Mental models, as argued by North (on shared mental models see Denzau and North 
1994), and individual perceptions (of poverty, inequality, and security) also shape the 
relationship between the various institutional components. Thus ‘failed states’ are 
characterized by self-reinforcing traps caused by social fragmentation that are further 
compounded by domestic poverty, the internationalization of resources,17 and the 
negative perceptions of all players, local and external (investors, donors). New 
institutional economics recognize the credibility of institutions and commitment by 
governments as being essential determinants of growth. Promises that are not credible in 
uncertain situations are characterized by low investment and preference of the status 
quo (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). New institutional economics defines credibility as a 
commitment to secure private rights; 18 this view however is unclear as to what 
combination of elements render an institutional form effectively credible (‘believed’) 
and binding, given that political power possesses, by definition, the authority to 
denounce this binding. In addition, securing private rights may be not the main element 
to achieve credibility or growth, especially in low-income countries. State institutions 
and government commitment to policy reforms are often perceived as having been 
‘privatized’ by political clientele and special interest groups, and thereby project low 
credibility. 
2.3  Discontinuities between micro and macro levels 
Institutions induce discontinuity in the channels that lead from globalization to poverty 
and poverty reduction; this discontinuity being determined but not easily predicted 
ex ante. The influence of institutions depends on functions, contents, and effectiveness 
that are observed ex post, especially regarding credibility, social cohesion, and the 
coherence of policies with institutions. Moreover, institutions induce discontinuities 
between micro and macro levels: causal mechanisms at the household level are not 
necessarily homologous to those operating at the macro (regional or country) level, for 
example, those linking growth and education, or income and education or health 
(Kanbur 2001). Discontinuities also arise from individual perceptions that may weigh 
                                                 
17  See Reno (1998) on the globalization of warlordism in SSA. 
18  On the credibility of political institutions in seventeenth century England as a key factor of growth, 
see North and Weingast (1989).   10
different dimensions of poverty and inequality.19 Aggregate threshold phenomena hide 
multiple microeconomic mechanisms that could explain possible unexpected effects. 
For example, micro group structures and hierarchies regulating access to capital and 
credit may transform the results of trade liberalization into an oligopoly controlled by a 
limited number of traders. 
Micro norms may unintentionally shape macro institutions: unwritten, customary 
(‘informal’) norms may modify the formal missions of public institutions, may work 
against them (through corruption) or may provide their legitimacy. Policy credibility is 
also a mechanism that introduces discontinuities between the macro and the micro 
levels, as well as problems of time consistency and anticipations of policy reversals. 
Even well devised reform (such as liberalization) may fail if civil servants adhere to 
different customary norms that are better-enforced (and may build self-enforcing 
equilibria). For a similar set of reasons, many of the poor targeted by otherwise well-
designed safety nets may be never reached. 
3  Threshold effects created by the political economy of institutions 
3.1  The political economy dimension of institutions 
Institutions may be conceived as being primarily shaped by political economy, 
reflecting the interests of groups in power at the expense of efficiency and the welfare 
of society, with no outside agency providing credibility to their commitments 
(Acemoglu 2002, 2003). Political economy, however, can also channel the positive 
effects of institutions towards growth, through political participation, social cohesion 
and management of social conflict, particularly when the latter is caused by external 
shocks and globalization (Rodrik 1998a, 2000, Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). 
The impact of globalization is influenced by domestic political economy structures and 
institutions such as social polarization, oligarchic structures, and predatory regimes, 
which may bias, distort or cancel the gains from globalization for particular groups of 
poor. One of the channels of the negative effects of inequality on growth is explained by 
a country’s political economy (e.g. pressures for redistributive fiscal policies: Benabou 
1996, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Bourguignon 2004b). The influence from political 
economy, whether positive or negative, is contingent on the nature of the groups 
devising the rules, their behaviour (productive, rent-seeking, exploiting institutions as 
resources), time horizons, and the intergenerational motives that shape their interests in 
redistribution and social cohesion. 
As shown by the example of Latin America, institutions born of a legacy of high 
economic and political inequality (land rights, schooling, financial institutions), and that 
prevent large segments of society benefiting from economic opportunities, go so way to 
explaining poor growth performance.20 In combination with tropical commodity 
                                                 
19  See Ravallion (2004) on perceptions of inequality that differ depending on whether weights are given 
to people or countries. 
20  Engerman and Sokoloff (2003a), Robinson (2000) on the determinants of inequality in Latin America 
as primarily political.   11
endowments this had led to the emergence of parasitic elites and a low level of public 
goods (universal education, for example), which have contributed to slowed growth 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2000).21 Indeed low income and commodity-exporting 
countries exhibit high levels of inequality and polarization. 
Political economy mechanisms contribute to threshold effects not only at the level of 
institutions but at the level of government policies, as both levels are endogenous to 
each other. For example, domestic political economy impinges on trade policies and 
therefore transforms the impact of globalization on to the poor. Thresholds effects 
depend on particular contexts (for example, income levels, inequality, factor 
endowments, possible poverty traps created by resource abundance,22 budget 
constraints and government’s redistributive preferences, the balance between interest 
groups, or the skewedness of political representation) and follow various channels, such 
as higher public spending (Rodrik 1998b, Garrett 1999, Boix 2002)23. In low-income 
countries characterized by inequality, rich elites appear to benefit more than the poor 
from trade openness, while in higher-income countries, the middle classes and the poor 
draw greater benefits from openness (Milanovic 2003a). The gains from global 
integration, in conjunction with democratic pressure, may also improve the situation of 
the poor by expanding access to education and lowering inequality, but the gains may 
be eroded by demands for government consumption and redistribution (Tavares and 
Wacziarg 2001). 
3.2  Public institutions against the poor 
Rational choice approaches have highlighted the role of incentives and interests, with 
public institutions serving as political markets for organized groups competing for 
power. Particular groups may ‘capture’ existing institutions. They may also refuse 
access to institutions and associated rights (such as land rights) to certain groups and 
individuals, even although the latter may be entitled to benefit from these rights and 
enjoy access. Institutions intrinsically include political contents and power relationships 
as rules, by definition, constitute both inclusive and exclusionary devices, and 
inherently create beneficiaries and losers.24 The particular design of institutions and 
actual enforcement of contracts and rights may in fine be analyzed as the outcomes of 
political power relationships. 
‘Empowerment’ has been put forward as a key mechanism of poverty reduction.25 It 
requires necessary conditions such as the existence of legal rules, which are, however, 
not sufficient. The institutions’ (empowerment) impact on poverty is influenced by the 
                                                 
21  On oligarchic political economy see Bourguignon and Verdier (2000). 
22   Against the thesis of the ‘curse’ defended by Sachs and Warner (e.g., 2001), see Blomström and 
Kokko (2001) on Sweden and Finland; on the positive relationship between resources and growth 
when associated with appropriate political institutions, Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
23  See Barro (1997) on the non-linear relationship between political institutions (democracy) and growth. 
24  Wars and conflicts have been viewed as the historical root cause for the emergence of states in the 
Western world, see Tilly (1985). 
25  For example, by the World Bank, along the lines of Amartya Sen’s conception of poverty.   12
type of political power that backs the enforcement of the rules, rights and contracts. 
Individuals may have rights, but if the apparatus of political power or competing 
traditional institutions prevent them from being enforced, formal institutions may be 
worthless. The effective content—function, meaning, credibility—of public institutions 
is not the pure translation of their formal dimension (such as courts and elected 
parliament). Institutional forms may be similar, but contents may be growth-enhancing, 
poverty-reducing, or emerge as predatory institutions. It may even be in the interest of a 
predatory ruler to prevent the consolidation of developmental institutions, which may 
threaten his/her power and monopoly on rents (Robinson 1996). 
Clienteles and corruption also crucially affect the redistribution of gains and losses 
created by globalization in general and to the poor in particular. They prevent the poor 
acceding to credit, investing, diversifying their economic activities and benefiting from 
basic public services like health and education that are necessary to harness the 
opportunities offered by globalization. For example, state service provision is 
recognized as essential for improving social indicators. Depending on its effective 
contents (organization, degree of corruption), however, it may either reduce poverty or 
function as an extorting device. Credibility and accountability of public institutions and 
policies are the ‘contents’ that can account for the discontinuity in the beneficial effects 
of institutions on poverty. In some low-income countries, because of political economy 
characteristics and weak institutionalization, the poor indeed perceive state institutions 
as being one of the causes of their poverty. Under certain thresholds, legal, health or 
educational infrastructures may act against the poor; above these thresholds these 
institutions may help the poor. 
Therefore, in a polarized context where rules are devised by and for groups in power, 
the functioning of state institutions may work against the poor, exclude them from the 
gains of global integration, and create inequalities. As institutions intrinsically include a 
political dimension, the types of winners and losers, domains and effective contents of 
rules and rights, and the groups with access to these rules and rights, result from events 
that are contingent and unpredictable ex ante. Winners and losers depend on the balance 
of power (i.e. which groups exercise power while others see their rights denied), and 
whether the objective of the group having the capacity to devise or manipulate the rules 
is redistribution or equality. 
4  Threshold effects and poverty traps induced by social institutions 
The diversity of the initial effects of globalization via institutions is examined at the 
level of social institutions and norms (household, group institutions, or ‘micro 
institutions’). 
4.1  Effects of globalization on micro institutions and poverty:  
a slow transformation 
The impact of globalization on poverty is mediated by local institutions, which create 
threshold effects both in modifying this impact and in transforming themselves under 
this impact. Aggregate observations—such as the fact that globalization and growth 
have been pro-poor in some regions and not in others—in fact correspond to a   13
multiplicity of micro mechanisms. In rural areas links to markets, education and access 
to land are key endowments (Christiaensen et al. 2003), which are regulated by social 
institutions, for example allocating rights to education or land according to gender, age 
or status. 
Local and social norms at the micro level change slowly and the impact of globalization 
is more likely to be channelled by local institutions than by transforming them in a 
spectacular way. Certain social norms show significant resilience, such as division of 
groups according to particular criteria (occupation, class, race, and so on) or political 
allegiance.26 Self-enforcing mechanisms and status quo bias may explain the resilience 
of social rules though their intrinsic inequality and, in some cases, inefficiency (Bowles 
2004). 
Institutional changes tend to work at the margin, ‘inside’ institutional forms. Traditional 
institutions may erode under the pressure of market integration, with the content and 
functions evolving under similar institutional forms (forms may evolve later). For 
example, customary land tenure may lose its social security and equity functions 
through individualized land rights and land concentration arising from market 
transactions (especially when combined with demographic pressure) (Platteau 2002). 
Similarly, a market ‘content’ may progressively characterize non-market institutions 
such as kin groups (using family for unpaid labour, for example). The trust mechanisms 
that accompany traditional networks may likewise be used in order to facilitate 
collective action towards entrepreneurial objectives.27 
4.2  Globalization transforming micro institutions, or channelled by them 
Global integration—the transmission of world prices (including volatility to farmers in 
the export sector)—impacts local prices, return-to-assets and incentives. The move 
towards lesser state intervention (stabilization schemes, for example) also alters 
customary rural institutions such as insurance mechanisms and tenancy contracts.28 
Land-abundant and labour-scarce low-income countries historically enjoy elaborate 
property rights ‘in man’ (kinship systems, rights on labour) and not only ‘in land’. 
Global integration and economic transformation have historically constituted key 
factors of change in these sets of rights.29 
On the other hand, local social institutions channel and modify the impact of 
globalization in negative and positive ways, depending on their history, and their 
particular structure and combination with other economic variables; as in the case of 
land tenure arrangements, inequality in land rights (ownership or access), and modes of 
                                                 
26  On the persistence of racial markers because of distorted cognitive processes, see Loury (2004). 
27  On the ‘network advantage’ of traders in SSA, see Fafchamps (2002). 
28  As in the Ivory Coast where increasing competition and direct exposure to international markets have 
called into question the customary rights allocated to Burkina Faso tenants, sometimes leading to their 
expulsion. 
29  In particular the disappearance of rights ‘in man’ (slavery, forced labour), see Engerman (1973), and 
Feeny (1989) on the replacement of rights ‘in man’ by rights ‘in land’ in Thailand in the nineteenth 
century.   14
revenue collection. History and path dependency indeed contribute to non-linear effects, 
for the impact of institutions on economic performance persist over time. As shown by 
Banerjee and Iyer (2002) with land rights and tenure in India, different historical 
(colonial) property rights have led to varying economic outcomes; for example areas 
where rights were granted to landlords exhibited lower agricultural investment, 
productivity, and investment in public goods than in areas where rights were given to 
the farming peasants. Land tenure and distribution are a key source of agricultural 
productivity and scale effects (increasing or decreasing returns).30 
4.3  The ex ante indeterminacy of the effects of social institutions 
Micro institutions and norms have ambiguous effects. There is ex ante indeterminacy in 
their response to globalization as well as in the effects of their response on poverty, 
which depends on their actual contents and how the opportunities created by 
globalization alter the previous institutional interactions and equilibria and induce new 
incentives. Institutions change depending on the context, to become adaptive or 
dysfunctional. They may create self-reinforcing traps, lock-in economic change in path 
dependency, or induce increasing returns as in the case of the adoption of a particular 
institution or technology. Micro institutions are fragmented; a specific element (a form 
or content) of an institution may have positive effects but which may be cancelled by 
other elements. Coupled with weak states and a predatory political economy (in customs 
services, for example), market integration and lower trade barriers may intensify 
‘informal’ norms and routines. Changes in technology or the value of a resource may be 
harmful as well as beneficial.31 
In rural areas, social inequality is likewise an important source of inefficiency, as it may 
be an obstacle to collective action (Baland and Platteau 1999). Local institutions, 
however, induce inequality according to discriminatory criteria based for example, on 
age, gender, and group membership within separate domains (production, consumption, 
technology, education, or communal politics). Inequality in a particular domain (land 
rights, production, labour, kinship) can therefore be attenuated by different hierarchies 
or by egalitarian arrangements in other domains. 
Similarly, as is well-known, SSA households rarely follow the unitary model. Women 
and men exercise different agricultural activities that reflect separate use and ownership 
of income32. Changes in relative prices and new market opportunities induced by 
globalization may modify and even reverse previous income inequalities. 
In developing countries, property rights coexist with other rights and uses, such as the 
variety of flexible arrangements that govern the exploitation of natural resources—
although institutional economics often equate institutions with property rights and view 
stability as a factor of efficiency, promoting growth and poverty reduction. Flexibility 
and instability have even been viewed as key features of ‘communal rights’ as opposed 
                                                 
30  Mwabu and Thorbecke (2004); Banerjee (2000) on the returns of land reforms. 
31  Alchian and Demsetz (1973) note the increased value of fur for the American Indians that led them to 
devise private rights in land that were consistent with a market economy. 
32  On separate accounts in the case of Ivory Coast, see Duflo and Udry (2003).   15
to private rights. Secondary rights or derived rights (access to land and land use) 
constitute flexible arrangements that are adaptations of local institutions (for migrant 
farmers, for example) (Lavigne-Delville et al. 2001, Lambert and Sindzingre 1995). 
These flexible arrangements may be efficient: the formalization of customary rights into 
property rights, which accompanies market integration, does not necessarily lead to 
greater efficiency in reducing poverty and creating markets, as in SSA—where private 
property rights have sometimes eroded customary cooperation rules, increased the 
perception of inequality and intensified redistributive conflicts. 
Social institutions however, may be inefficient in a context of norms that are shared by 
groups of limited size, as in the case of customary arrangements in rural areas (for 
example, risk-sharing and insurance)33. Formalized state institutions and legal systems, 
though possibly inefficient (corrupt, maybe), can provide the poor with protection 
against local institutions, which may be highly inequitable—and the collapse of these 
inefficient legal systems may be harmful for the poor, as has been the case in various 
transition countries. 
4.4  Poverty traps created by social norms 
The negative or positive outcome of social norms are illustrated by the well-known 
issue of the fragmentation effects of group affiliations (Easterly and Levine 1997), and 
their controversial impact on growth and poverty reduction. As noted by Bowles (2004), 
the poor find themselves at a disadvantage in implementing large-scale coordinated 
collective action that aims at more equal institutions; moreover, they lack information 
more than others do. Norms allow cooperation, risk-sharing, provide insurance and local 
public goods via various enforcement mechanisms (trust, reputation, reciprocity). They 
may alleviate—but cannot suppress—the other poverty trap mechanisms. ‘Social assets’ 
may alleviate elements of persistent poverty such as low returns on uneducated labour 
and financial constraints (Adato et al. 2003). However, the scope for exchanges, the 
capacity to enforce rules and punishment, and the control of free-riding tend to be 
confined to the members of networks. (Greif 1989, 1994, Platteau 1994, Fafchamps 
1992). 
Groups reinforce solidarity and protection, but they also exclude. Lack of social 
affiliation implies greater degrees of freedom, but also limited access to capital or 
credit. Shared norms (based on occupation, ethnicity, location) sustain networks that 
encourage capital accumulation and are better able to take advantage of globalization 
(such as international trade networks; Malaizé and Sindzingre 1998). They alleviate 
poverty by reducing the cost of access to capital, credit and labour and via mechanisms 
supporting mutual assistance. 
Shared norms simultaneously induce discontinuities and threshold effects in the 
potential benefits of global exchanges34. They foster social fragmentation 
(discrimination, prejudice) and build separated social identities that receive different 
payoffs for their actions, orient choices and economic behaviour (Akerlof and Kranton 
                                                 
33  On the inefficiencies of traditional social arrangements, Platteau (1997, 2000).  
34  On the detrimental effects of social heterogeneity and fractionalization, see Alesina and La Ferrara 
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2000), lower participation in social activities, hinder collective action, and bias the 
redistribution of public resources towards certain groups and against others. The 
multiplication of nation-states in history reveals the relevance of state institutions in 
creating and attenuating redistributive conflicts. Ethnic membership is also an 
expression of unequal access to and competition over public goods, infrastructure, 
political and natural resources, and of the incapacity of state institutions to provide 
credible solutions (Sindzingre 2002). 
Globalization’s positive effects may be locked-in by group-building institutions, which 
politically or economically exclude groups from its benefits (for example, politicians 
using public revenues from external trade for redistribution towards their ethnic group). 
Parallel with other factors, though, globalization may exacerbate competition and social 
fragmentation, while eroding the previous mechanisms of control of opportunistic 
behaviour (extreme cases being the conflicts fuelled by the international exploitation of 
natural resources). 
Finally, self-reinforcing poverty traps may be built by social institutions, on which 
globalization may have an aggravating impact. Social discrimination against 
occupational or ethnic minorities, for example, gives rise to poverty traps in creating 
differences in returns to productive characteristics.35 Likewise, when exposed to a 
market economy, kinship arrangements and their rules of reciprocal exchange and 
obligation may distort labour markets. Institutional forms (kinship, modern organization 
of the firm) seem to be stable but their contents are skewed towards new functions and 
effects (recruiting on the basis of kin and not competence, excluding non-members). 
Globalization may even reinforce kinship institutions, as opportunities of improvements 
in the context of uncertainty may lead to a preference for the status quo (‘collective 
conservatism’36) and hence build poverty traps. Poverty traps are induced by 
conservative risk-coping and investment strategies, as the poor are close to subsistence 
and invest in assets with low returns while the wealthier invest in higher-risk and higher 
returns.37 
4.5  Virtuous processes induced by globalization 
In contrast, globalization may induce positive institutional changes in local institutions. 
Reliance on social transformation, mediated by public policies such as legal reforms 
regarding social status or land (right, contracts), may have positive effects in terms of 
poverty reduction, efficiency and productivity.38 
Conversely, the pre-existence of certain micro-institutions when economic activities are 
exposed to globalization may trigger virtuous paths that reduce poverty. Higher levels 
of ‘participation’ lead to better economic outcomes and better public goods provision 
(Banerjee and Iyer 2002). Following the dismantling of state marketing boards, 
producers who constituted membership-based organizations and associations were more 
                                                 
35  Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) on the example of ethnic minorities in Vietnam. 
36  Hoff and Sen (2004), relying on Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
37  Among a vast literature, see Zimmerman and Carter (2003). 
38  Banerjee et al. (2002) on the reforms of tenancy laws in West Bengal in the late 1970s.   17
able to overcome collective action problems and the fragmentation of customary 
institutions, and act as intermediate institutions vis-à-vis international markets. 
Within the same rural areas, households that have organized themselves (choosing 
crops, for example) in order to diversify their source of income have better exploited 
globalization, and vice-versa: households that were least diversified incurred more 
negative effects. In Mali for example, some households simultaneously engage in cash 
crop (cotton) and food crop agriculture, in tandem with tenancy arrangements on cocoa 
plantations in neighbouring Ivory Coast (the world’s main exporter), thus adding the 
remittances to their income through the use and adaptation of traditional household 
structures (such as large households) (Hillborst et al. 1999). 
5  Poverty traps compounded by macro conditions 
Threshold effects may emerge at an aggregate level, which translate threshold effects 
occurring at a micro level—the micro-macro distinction is used only for heuristic 
reasons as there is a continuum between these levels and a combination of institutional 
forms and contents. This is shown by the examples of poverty traps created by trade 
structure and the institutions coping with external shocks. Poverty traps may be 
generated through reciprocal interactions between the macro and the micro levels, 
involving public institutions and policies, and individual responses mediated by social 
institutions. The continuum between micro institutions (organizing status and rights 
according to age, gender, occupation) and macro institutions (the public or ‘modern’ 
sectors) may build traps that separate the poor from individuals who can trigger a 
process of wealth accumulation (Azariadis 2004). 
5.1  The cumulative processes created by the interaction between public policies 
and institutions 
In low-income countries, particularly commodity-exporting ones, the cause of poverty is 
less globalization than the structure of economies and exports. An increase in trade does 
not reduce poverty in low-income countries (the ‘international poverty trap’ that stems 
from commodity export dependence) (UNCTAD 2004). State institutions and policies, 
however, contribute to a cumulative process and threshold effects, in creating devices 
that either maintain, aggravate or reduce dependence, and modify the existing economic 
structures. Price stabilization schemes, monopsonies, and marketing boards have been 
implemented by states as interfaces between global markets and producers. In some 
countries these institutions, combined with political economy and economic elements, 
have been inefficient, inequitable or even predatory (for example, when taxing 
producers in order to finance political interest groups) (Deaton 1999). 
International commodity price volatility however, includes thresholds below which 
peasants limit risk, investment, loans and diversification in more productive crops and 
non-farm activities (and above which they do).39 Depending on particular institutional 
                                                 
39    Among a vast literature on shocks (price fluctuations, weather), vulnerability, and rural risk 
management, see Fafchamps (1999, 2000) and Dercon (2002).   18
and economic combinations, interlinked contracts implemented by state stabilization 
and marketing schemes have smoothed the pass-through of world price changes and 
protected commodity producers from volatility. They have been efficient risk 
management tools in the context of inefficient market mechanisms, financing 
agricultural inputs, providing credit, stabilizing income expectations, and providing 
insurance, as for cocoa in Ivory Coast or cotton in West Africa.40 
Domestic trade liberalization policies starting in the 1980s have exposed commodity 
producers to the large and asymmetrical effects of world price volatility.41 After the 
dismantling of stabilization schemes, non-state institutions did not fully substitute for 
their functions, domestic and external. Market mechanisms alone may be unable to 
provide the security previously provided by state schemes. Local market mechanisms 
controlling opportunistic behaviour among intermediate private buyers may be 
inefficient, with producers having to cope with the unpredictability of prices and profits, 
limited access to credit, capital and inputs. In SSA, the historical weakness of the 
domestic private sector sometimes made it so that the opportunities offered by 
liberalization were captured by intermediaries.42 Market power here shifts from 
producers to a small number of concentrated private actors. The liberalization of the 
coffee market, for example, did not improve price transmission, and private actors 
became concentrated at the processing and retailing levels (Sheperd 2004). In the Ivory 
Coast, subsequent to the liberalization of the palm oil sector, production and quality 
were reduced due to the cost of inputs, segmentation of production, and the 
disappearance of the public institutional framework that provided security, learning, 
coordination and sanction of opportunism (Cheyns et al. 2001). 
Rural institutions, however, may also be inefficient because of covariate risk (climatic, 
for example). Rural associations may be affected by problems of inadequate 
information, transaction costs incurred from limited scale, problems of coordination and 
collective action, weak market bargaining power vis-à-vis a few international trading 
firms, and efficiency-equity dilemmas that are detrimental to the poorest producers.43 
Producers have responded to exposure to international price fluctuations with permanent 
income strategies leading to over-production, as for cocoa in Ivory Coast, in turn 
increasing price volatility. The known threshold effects stemming from the fallacy of 
composition typically constitute a trap that results from information and collective 
action problems. There have been winners, but inequalities may have also been created: 
when benefiting from better access to markets (such as roads), for example, commodity 
producers may have benefited more from liberalization than those producing food crops 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson 1992). 
The ways public and social institutions, as well as the interactions between them and 
with market structures (for example, increasing returns), are modified by liberalization 
channel the impact on the rural poor. Discontinuous and non-linear characteristics of 
                                                 
40  On the effects of liberalization of cotton, see Poulton et al. (2002). 
41  Cashin et al. (2002); on the asymmetric effects of downturn on poverty, see Agenor (2002a). 
42  On the oligopolies in the cotton sector in Zimbabwe, see Larsen (2002). 
43  On the cocoa and cotton sectors in West Africa after liberalization, see Araujo-Bonjean and Combes 
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this impact were pointed out by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943): rural markets at early stages 
of development suffer coordination failure, multiple equilibria and underdevelopment 
traps with lack of growth under certain thresholds. Combining the macro and micro 
levels, underdevelopment traps create threshold effects. As shown by Hoff (2000) in the 
example of China, micro features (modernization, diversification) may determine local 
poverty traps among farm households. Various spill-over effects (externalities) may 
lead to a series of traps (in terms of investment, technology) with low innovation and 
inefficient institutions. 
5.2  Public institutions and policies as instruments of transformation 
Globalization may trigger institutional change. State institutions and policies, however, 
reorient the effects of globalization on institutions and poverty as well as the effects of 
local institutions on poverty—for example, industrial, trade, social policies. 
Government policies, and not only institutions, contribute to the formation of poverty 
traps and are endogenous to these institutions (‘state failure’, ‘political failure’; see 
Besley and Coate 1998, quoted in Hoff 2000). Depending on the environment (for 
example the political economy), policies may be affected by credibility problems and be 
unable to reduce poverty or attenuate shocks (Ravallion 2001). 
Public policies, laws, and institutions also have the capacity to sustain a change in social 
norms and micro political economy mechanisms in a way that benefits the poor, when 
combined with political institutions, for example democracy—though democracy is 
endogenous to the political economy (the effective content of democratic forms may be 
clientelism). A wider distribution of benefits not confined to the rich or to individuals 
who are affiliated with a particular group falls within the domain of public policy and 
the legal apparatus (one example being affirmative action). Effective local democracy 
and accountability in rural areas have positive effects on poverty (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001), and democratic countries seem to be less ensnared in the 
‘fractionalization-as-politics’ trap (Milanovic 2003b, on the case of SSA). 
Public policies have positive impacts on institutions, on their effect on the poor, and on 
the effects of globalization, when they correct market failures—for example through 
facilitating access to finance (on India see Burgess and Pande 2003, Besley 2003), 
supporting rural industrialization (Foster and Rosenzweig 2003), and basic public 
services, such as female education (Ravallion and Datt 2002). Public policies may 
support market-related institutions as they did historically for merchants during the 
transition to capitalism (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990). They may likewise ease 
the global demand for goods produced by the poor (Basu 2003). Particular combinations 
of institutions, policies, and economic structures however, are what determine in fine 
the impact of globalization. Elements taken separately have unpredictable effects but the 
outcomes of their combination may be growth and poverty reduction. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the relationships between globalization, poverty and 
institutions. While the relationship between institutions and growth is now a matter of 
increasing attention, this has been less the case regarding the whole causal chain linking 
globalization, institutions, and poverty. Assessments of the impact of globalization on 
the poor have revealed marked divergence in the literature. It has been shown that the 
threshold effects created by institutions constitute a dimension of the explanation of 
these diverging impacts. The triangular causalities that relate globalization, poverty and 
institutions constitute multiple, endogenous, cumulative and non-linear processes. 
Institutions mediate the impact of globalization on the poor. Institutions have been 
analyzed following an original theoretical approach that views institutions as composite 
arrangements. It disaggregates the concept of institution according to its various 
components (forms and contents) and their particular combination. 
Because institutions are composite arrangements, they create discontinuities and 
generate threshold effects upon the positive or negative effects of globalization, with 
social institutions and norms being a case in point. Institutions may also generate 
poverty traps. These threshold effects may be compounded by public institutions and 
policies. Conversely, globalization may induce a positive transformation of institutions. 
Institutions likewise enhance the impact of globalization and trigger virtuous paths that 
reduce poverty. 
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